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OPINION* 
__________ 
 
 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Karl Bastien petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order 
dismissing his appeal.  He contends the Board erred by affirming the Immigration 
Judge’s decision to deny withholding of removal (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)) and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture (8 C.F.R. §1208.16(c)(2)).  Bastien 
claims that the Immigration Judge failed to consider critical evidence and that his ruling 
was based upon numerous errors.  We will deny the petition. 
 The Government argues that we do not have jurisdiction to consider Bastien’s 
petition because he is convicted of an aggravated felony and our review is, therefore, 
limited to constitutional issues and questions of law.  Toussaint v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 
409, 412, n.3 (3d Cir. 2006).  Bastien maintains the Immigration Judge’s handling of the 
case raised a number of questions of law.  Although we ultimately do not agree that the 
Immigration Judge made any legal errors, we agree (as is evident in the discussion that 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
3 
 
follows) that Bastien’s petition raises questions of law that give us jurisdiction to rule on 
them.1   
 According to Bastien, when the Immigration Judge analyzed his withholding of 
removal claim, he wrongly required direct evidence—rejecting his circumstantial 
evidence—on the motive and identity of persons who attacked his family members.  See 
Espinosa-Cortez v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 607 F.3d 101, 108-9 (3d Cir. 2010).  
He also contends that the Immigration Judge erred by refusing to impute his family’s 
political opinions to him as a basis for the likelihood of persecution.  See Dia v. Ashcroft, 
353 F.3d 228, 255 (3d Cir. 2003).  The record does not support any of this.   
 Bastien and his witnesses alleged that the perpetrators of five violent crimes 
against his family, all occurring over a span of nine years, were “zinglindou:”  a gang in 
Haiti who attacks former associates of the Duvalier regime for political revenge.  
However, neither Bastien nor any of the witnesses grounded their opinion of who was 
responsible, or the reason for the attacks, in any evidence.  The Immigration Judge did 
not demand that Bastien provide direct evidence of the identity and motives of the 
attackers.  Rather, he was properly requiring more than conjecture to show that the 
attacks were political retribution as opposed to random criminal violence.  Such evidence 
was necessary to support a ruling that Bastien was likely to be persecuted if returned to 
Haiti.  The Immigration Judge properly judged Bastien’s reliance both on the cumulative 
impact of five separate attacks over nine years, and on new evidence offered on remand 
                                              
1Since this opinion does not have any precedential value our discussion of this case, 
which has a complicated procedural history, is limited to covering only what is necessary 
to explain our decision to the parties.   
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(concerning his father’s prominence in the Duvalier regime and the murder of his cousin) 
as inadequate to meet his evidentiary burden.2  
 Bastien also claims that the Immigration Judge erred by refusing to impute the  
political views of his family to him.  However, we conclude that this allegation is 
inaccurate and largely immaterial to the decision on his claim, since he did not first 
establish that any violence had resulted from these views.  The Board correctly decided 
that the Immigration Judge got it right.  Bastien’s request for withholding of removal 
failed because a mere belief that zinglindou are responsible for the past violence to his 
family is not enough to ground his claim that he is likely to be persecuted—or that his life 
or freedom would be threatened—because of his family identity if returned to Haiti.3 
 Bastien next argues that the Board wrongly affirmed the Immigration Judge’s 
denial of his claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture.  Specifically, Bastien 
claims that the Board should have reversed the Immigration Judge’s decision because he 
did not comply with the regulation that “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future 
torture shall be considered.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.16.  He contends that the Immigration Judge 
                                              
2 Bastien applied for asylum, withholding from removal and relief under the Convention 
Against Torture in 2003.  In 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated 
the Board’s denial of his appeal, and remanded the case, incorporating a stipulation by 
the parties that the Immigration Judge made three legal errors in his decision.  Upon 
Bastien’s request, the case was transferred to the Immigration Court in Philadelphia, PA. 
      
3In his oral decision, the Immigration Judge addressed the remand’s stipulations of error 
in his prior decision by:  holding an evidentiary hearing; addressing the new evidence 
offered by Bastien; and, by explaining that he was not ruling evidence of violence against 
family members inadequate because they bore a different last name.  Instead, his ruling 
was based on the lack of evidence establishing a connection between the violence and 
political retribution.    
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ignored a State Department Country Report and evidence offered by an expert.  We do 
not find any support for Bastien’s assertion.  
 The Immigration Judge is required to consider all evidence relevant to torture.  
But, as we have repeatedly said, we do not require Immigration Judges to discuss every 
facet of the record in their decisions.  Green v. Attorney General of the United States, 694 
F.3d 503, 509 (3d Cir. 2012).  In his oral decision, the Immigration Judge explicitly 
referred to both the Report and the expert’s testimony and declarations.  He said that 
evidence Bastien proffered documented that conditions in Haitian prisons in 2010 were 
harsh.  He also knew that Haitian authorities were detaining some repatriated citizens 
with criminal records upon their reentry to the country, and said that some of these 
persons alleged “corruption, widespread discrimination and social abuse after returning 
home.” A.R. 105.  However, he commented that none of this evidence related to 
conditions post-earthquake.  Further, he said that, according to the State Department 
Country Report, the length of the detention for criminal deportees had been substantially 
shortened.  Finally, he highlighted the expert’s status as a paid witness, the frequency of 
her testimony in other cases, and her political agenda, signaling that he would weigh the 
evidence she offered with all of this in mind.  The Board determined that the Immigration 
Judge was well within his discretion to give the expert’s testimony limited weight 
because of this. 
 All of this convinces us that the Immigration Judge considered the entire record 
before him and made a decision by weighing all credible evidence relevant to Bastien’s 
claim for relief under the Convention.  We do not second-guess his decision to give the 
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expert’s testimony limited weight, and we reject Bastien’s attempt to describe the 
Immigration Judge’s use of this discretion as a failure to consider this portion of the 
record.4  The Board did not err by affirming the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that 
Bastien did not meet his evidentiary burden, which was to establish the likelihood that 
Haitian authorities intended to imprison him upon his reentry to the country for the 
purpose of torturing him, or to enable others to do so.5     
 For all of these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                              
4 To the extent Bastien seeks CAT relief on the ground that he would be targeted for 
torture in prison specifically because he is from a family tied to the Duvalier regime, i.e., 
a variant of the same argument he raised in connection with withholding of removal, our 
determination that the IJ properly required more than conjecture disposes of the claim.  
We are not persuaded that the IJ misconstrued or failed to address this argument; rather 
the IJ considered all evidence relevant to torture (including evidence about Bastien's 
family ties) before denying his CAT claim. 
 
5 The Board noted that Bastien’s failure to produce evidence of the likelihood of torture 
obviated the need to address the issue of whether the government was unwilling or unable 
to control non-governmental groups who would torture Bastien.  This addressed a 
stipulation in its prior remand on the Immigration Judge’s error in his first decision 
regarding the legal significance of a government’s failure or unwillingness to control 
non-governmental groups who would inflict harm.    
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
Although much of the majority’s opinion is indisputably correct, I disagree in one 
important respect and thus respectfully dissent.  I agree that the Immigration Judge (IJ) 
and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) properly considered all the evidence Bastien 
submitted in support of his contention that if he returned to Haiti he would be persecuted.  
I believe, however, that the BIA and the IJ misconstrued Bastien’s argument with respect 
to the Convention Against Torture (CAT), rendering their decision inadequate for 
meaningful appellate review. 
As the majority notes, our jurisdiction in this matter is limited.  Because Bastien is 
a “criminal alien” within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act, we lack 
jurisdiction to review whether the BIA and the IJ’s ultimate findings of fact are correct.  
Nevertheless, “where the BIA is alleged to have made a . . . determination based on an 
erroneous legal standard or on fact-finding which is flawed by an error of law, our 
jurisdiction to review that determination is secure.”  Pareja v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 615 
F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  And, 
crucially here, we may vacate and remand a BIA decision when its analysis “fail[s] to 
attend to [a petitioner’s] actual argument.”  Roye v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 693 F.3d 333, 342 
(3d Cir. 2012).  This is because a decision that erroneously evaluates a claim is 
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inadequate for the meaningful appellate review to which a putative deportee is entitled.  
See Cruz v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 452 F.3d 240, 242–43 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Without the 
BIA’s view as to whether Cruz still has the requisite ‘conviction’ under the INA for his 
removal, we cannot determine our own jurisdiction.”).   
Before the BIA and the IJ, Bastien made two arguments that the CAT bars his 
removal.  The first is that, upon his return to Haiti, he would suffer from the same 
extraordinary violence that has plagued his family (five and possibly six family members 
have been murdered).  The BIA and the IJ denied him relief on this ground because 
Bastien failed to demonstrate state involvement in the murders, and thus he did not 
produce evidence from which the BIA and the IJ could infer that Bastien would be 
tortured.  We lack jurisdiction to review this finding of fact, and I agree with my 
colleagues’ disposition of this argument.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) & (D). 
I part ways with them, however, as to Bastien’s second argument, which neither 
the IJ nor the BIA addressed.  Bastien also argued that, when he is returned to Haiti, he 
will be put in prison as a criminal deportee, and officials at the prison will single him out 
for mistreatment rising to the level of torture based on the perception both of his support 
for the Duvalier regime and of his wealth.   
The majority apparently understands Bastien to argue that the BIA and the IJ 
failed to consider all the relevant evidence that he would be tortured.  He does raise that 
argument, and I agree with the majority that it fails.  But Bastien also argues that the BIA 
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and the IJ “failed to meaningfully analyze [his] legal arguments with respect to his CAT 
claims.”  Br. at 29 (emphasis added).  This is different from his failure-to-consider-
evidence claim, and to me it should be a winner.   
Bastien correctly informs us that, in his submissions to the BIA and the IJ, he 
contended he would be “singled out” and “target[ed] for abuse” because of his perceived 
support for Duvalier and his perceived wealth.  Id. at 30–31 & n.2.  There can be no 
question he presented this argument to the IJ:  
[T]he government has singled out Duvalierists for prolonged detention . . . .  [T]he 
police and immigration officials will be on the look out [sic] for Duvalierists 
among the criminal deportees . . . .  In addition, the police are likely to assume that 
Mr. Bastien has access to American money and will thus use whatever means are 
necessary, including starvation and beatings, to extort money from him.  
In re: Karl Henry Marshall Bastien, No. A-41-585002, Bastien’s Pre-hearing Br. at 22–
25 (Mar. 9, 2009).  And he made the argument to the BIA as well: 
The IJ relied on the holding in Pierre v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 528 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 
2008) that “it is not torture for the Government of Haiti to detain criminal 
detainees without a specific intent to torture them.”  April 11, 2011 Decision at 9.  
However, . . . Respondent’s claim for relief under CAT was based in part on his 
well-supported claims that he would be subjected to abuse rising to the level of 
torture specifically because he is a member of the Bastien-LaCroix family. . . . 
In re: Karl Henry Marshall Bastien, No. A-41-585-002, Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Respondent’s Appeal from Decision of the Immigration Judge at 22 (Sept. 21, 2011) 
(emphasis in original). 
As Bastien argues to us (and as he argued to the BIA), the IJ misconstrued this 
claim as an argument that Haitian prison conditions in themselves are so severe as to 
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inflict torture within the meaning of the CAT, and the IJ rejected it, relying on our 
precedent.  In re: Karl Henry Marshall Bastien, No. A-41-585-002, Oral Decision of the 
Immigration Judge at 8–9 (citing Pierre, 528 F.3d at 189 (“The lack of medical care and 
likely pain that Pierre will experience is an unfortunate but unintended consequence of 
the poor conditions in the Haitian prisons, which exist because of Haiti’s extreme 
poverty. We find that this unintended consequence is not the type of proscribed purpose 
contemplated by the CAT.”)).  The BIA affirmed this holding without additional analysis. 
By misconstruing Bastien’s legal argument about what would happen to him in 
prison—that he was entitled to relief under the CAT because he would be singled out for 
torture because of his family and perceived wealth—the conclusion of the BIA and the IJ 
that he had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of torture was “flawed by an error of law,” 
Pareja at 188, specifically a misunderstanding of what Bastien was arguing.  The record 
is thus inadequate for meaningful appellate review of whether the BIA and the IJ properly 
applied the CAT to Bastien’s claim. 
Nor can the BIA and the IJ’s failure to address the argument Bastien actually made 
be considered harmless error.  To the contrary, the misconstruction of Bastien’s 
significant and clearly presented claim calls into question whether Bastien received a 
meaningful hearing before the BIA or the IJ.  Thus I would grant the petition for review 
with respect to Bastien’s CAT claim. 
In this context, I respectfully dissent in part. 
